kernel/security/apparmor/ipc.c
2024-07-22 17:22:30 +08:00

219 lines
5.9 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* AppArmor security module
*
* This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
* Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
*/
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/capability.h"
#include "include/cred.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/ipc.h"
#include "include/sig_names.h"
/**
* audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
* @mask: permission mask to convert
*
* Returns: pointer to static string
*/
static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask)
{
switch (mask) {
case MAY_READ:
return "read";
case MAY_WRITE:
return "trace";
case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
return "readby";
case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
return "tracedby";
}
return "";
}
/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request));
if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
/* TODO: conditionals */
static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
struct common_audit_data *sa)
{
struct aa_perms perms = { };
aad(sa)->peer = peer;
aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
&perms);
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
}
static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
struct common_audit_data *sa)
{
if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
!PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
return 0;
return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
}
static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
struct common_audit_data *sa)
{
if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
return 0;
if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
if (&tracer->label == tracee)
return 0;
aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
aad(sa)->request = 0;
aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
CAP_OPT_NONE);
return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
}
/**
* aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
* @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
* @tracee: task label to be traced
* @request: permission request
*
* Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
*/
int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
u32 request)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
}
static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
{
if (sig > SIGRTMAX)
return SIGUNKNOWN;
else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN)
return sig - SIGRTMIN + SIGRT_BASE;
else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
return sig_map[sig];
return SIGUNKNOWN;
}
/**
* audit_signal_mask - convert mask to permission string
* @mask: permission mask to convert
*
* Returns: pointer to static string
*/
static const char *audit_signal_mask(u32 mask)
{
if (mask & MAY_READ)
return "receive";
if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
return "send";
return "";
}
/**
* audit_cb - call back for signal specific audit fields
* @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL)
* @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL)
*/
static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->request));
if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
}
}
if (aad(sa)->signal == SIGUNKNOWN)
audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)",
aad(sa)->unmappedsig);
else if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]);
else
audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
aad(sa)->signal - SIGRT_BASE);
audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
struct common_audit_data *sa)
{
struct aa_perms perms;
unsigned int state;
if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
return 0;
aad(sa)->peer = peer;
/* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
aad(sa)->signal);
aa_label_match(profile, peer, state, false, request, &perms);
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb);
}
int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL);
aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig);
aad(&sa)->unmappedsig = sig;
return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile,
profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &sa),
profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &sa));
}