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Add comments in DropPrivileges() explaining the kernel bug further.

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R=rsesek@chromium.org

Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/725303003
This commit is contained in:
Mark Mentovai 2014-11-17 12:24:38 -05:00
parent 09d3a6c695
commit d5b28d6236
1 changed files with 21 additions and 3 deletions
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24
util/posix/drop_privileges.cc
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@ -27,14 +27,30 @@ void DropPrivileges() {
// Based on the POSIX.1-2008 2013 edition documentation for setreuid() and // Based on the POSIX.1-2008 2013 edition documentation for setreuid() and
// setregid(), setreuid() and setregid() alone should be sufficient to drop // setregid(), setreuid() and setregid() alone should be sufficient to drop
// privileges. The standard specifies that the saved ID should be set to the // privileges. The standard specifies that the saved ID should be set to the
// effective ID whenever the real ID is not -1, and whenever the effective ID // effective ID whenever the real ID is not -1, or whenever the effective ID
// is set not equal to the real ID. This code never specifies -1, so the // is set not equal to the real ID. This code never specifies -1, so the
// setreuid() and setregid() alone should work according to the standard. // setreuid() and setregid() alone should work according to the standard.
// //
// In practice, on Mac OS X, setuid() and setgid() (or seteuid() and // In practice, on Mac OS X, setuid() and setgid() (or seteuid() and
// setegid()) must be called first, otherwise, setreuid() and setregid() do // setegid()) must be called first. Otherwise, setreuid() and setregid() do
// not alter the saved IDs, leaving open the possibility for future privilege // not alter the saved IDs, leaving open the possibility for future privilege
// escalation. This bug is filed as radar 18987552. // escalation.
//
// The problem exists in 10.9.5 xnu-2422.115.4/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
// setreuid(). Based on its comments, it purports to set the svuid to the new
// euid when the old svuid doesn’t match one of the new ruid and euid. This
// isn’t how POSIX.1-2008 says it should behave, but it should work for this
// function’s purposes. In reality, setreuid() doesn’t even do this: it sets
// the svuid to the old euid, which does not drop privileges when the old euid
// is different from the desired euid. The workaround of calling setuid() or
// seteuid() before setreuid() works because it sets the euid so that by the
// time setreuid() runs, the old euid is actually the value that ought to be
// set as the svuid. setregid() is similar. This bug is filed as radar
// 18987552.
//
// setuid() and setgid() alone will only set the saved IDs when running as
// root. When running a setuid non-root or setgid program, they do not alter
// the saved ID, and do not effect a permanent privilege drop.
gid_t egid = getegid(); gid_t egid = getegid();
PCHECK(setgid(gid) == 0) << "setgid"; PCHECK(setgid(gid) == 0) << "setgid";
PCHECK(setregid(gid, gid) == 0) << "setregid"; PCHECK(setregid(gid, gid) == 0) << "setregid";
@ -65,6 +81,8 @@ void DropPrivileges() {
// CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities, which may be granted to non-root // CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities, which may be granted to non-root
// processes. Since the setresXid() interface is well-defined, it shouldn’t be // processes. Since the setresXid() interface is well-defined, it shouldn’t be
// necessary to perform any additional checking anyway. // necessary to perform any additional checking anyway.
//
// TODO(mark): Drop CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID if present and non-root?
#else #else
#error Port this function to your system. #error Port this function to your system.
#endif #endif